It's pretty old topic but still up-to-date and surprisingly bringing higher impact nowadays. As Jon mentioned, it might be just a mistake Java's designers made at the very beginning. But I wouldn't imagine before it can have impact on security.
Many coders know Apache Velocity, flexible and powerful template engine. It's so powerful that it allows to feed template with a set of named objects - stricly considered as objects from programming language (Java originally). Those objects can be accessed from within template like in programming language so for example Java's String instance can be used with all its public fields, properties and methods
$input.isEmpty()
where input is a String, runs directly through JVM and returns true or false to Velocity parser's output). So far so good.
But in Java all objects inherit from Object so our end-users can also put this to the template
$input.getClass()
to get an instance of String Class.
And with this reference they can also call a static method forName(String) on this
$input.getClass().forName("java.io.FileDescriptor")
use any class name and use it to whatever web server's account can do (deface, steal DB content, inspect config files, ...)
This exploit is somehow (in specific context) described here: https://github.com/veracode-research/solr-injection#7-cve-2019-17558-rce-via-velocity-template-by-_s00py
It wouldn't be possible if calling static methods from reference to the instance of class was prohibited.
I'm not saying that a particular programming framework is better than the other one or so but I just want to put a comparison. There's a port of Apache Velocity for .NET. In C# it's not possible to call static methods just from instance's reference what makes exploit like this useless:
$input.GetType().GetType("System.IO.FileStream, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089")