It is not that you simply need to do "hash = sha512(salt + hash)" - it's more complex than that. An HMAC is a better way of adding your salt (and PBKDF2 is based on HMAC - see below for more detail on PBKDF2) - there's a good discussion at When is it safe to use a broken hash function? for those details.
You are correct in that you need to have multiple iterations of a hash function for security.
However, don't roll your own. See How to securely hash passwords?, and note that PBKDF2, BCrypt, and Scrypt are all means of doing so.
PBKDF2, also known as PKCS#5v2 and RFC2898 is in fact reasonably close to what you're doing (multiple iterations of a normal hash function), particular in the form of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-512, in particular section 5.2 lists:
For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined
below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and
the block index to compute the block:
T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,
T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,
...
T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,
where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the
first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF
applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S
and the block index i:
F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c
where
U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) ,
U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) ,
...
U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) .
Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
significant octet first.
P.S. SHA-512 was a good choice of hash primitive - SHA-512 (and SHA-384) are also superior to MD5, SHA-1, and even SHA-224 and SHA-256 because SHA-384 and up use 64-bit operations which current GPU's (early 2014) do not have as much of an advantage over current CPU's with as they do 32-bit operations, thus reducing the margin of superiority attackers have for offline attacks.