volatile
might be overkill sometimes as it would also affect all the other uses of a variable.
Use memset_s
(since C11): http://en.cppreference.com/w/c/string/byte/memset
memset may be optimized away (under the as-if rules) if the object modified by this function is not accessed again for the rest of its lifetime. For that reason, this function cannot be used to scrub memory (e.g. to fill an array that stored a password with zeroes). This optimization is prohibited for memset_s: it is guaranteed to perform the memory write.
int secret_foo(void)
{
int key = get_secret();
/* use the key to do highly privileged stuff */
....
memset_s(&key, sizeof(int), 0, sizeof(int));
return result;
}
You can find other solutions for various platforms/C standards here: https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/MSC06-C.+Beware+of+compiler+optimizations
Addendum: have a look at this article Zeroing buffer is insufficient which points out other problems (besides zeroing the actual buffer):
With a bit of care and a cooperative compiler, we can zero a buffer — but that's not what we need. What we need to do is zero every location where sensitive data might be stored. Remember, the whole reason we had sensitive information in memory in the first place was so that we could use it; and that usage almost certainly resulted in sensitive data being copied onto the stack and into registers.
Your key
value might have been copied into another location (like a register or temporary stack/memory location) by the compiler and you don't have any control to clear that location.