Let's imagine a solution like this:
1 ) Client No.[1~10000] calls REQ.send()
to request a reply from Attestation-server
2 ) Attestation-server in an infinite loop REP.poll( 0, ZMQ_POLLIN )
-s to detect any new request arrival and if any present in the incoming-queue, it REP.recv()
-s the next request-to-reply
3 ) upon the Attestation-server's decision, it may, yet need not, deliver a meaningful or meaningless response to the Client, who asked for attestation and prepares and sets a new server-side AccessPoint for "Out-of-Band"-private-channel communication as requested above. A pool-of-one-time-used AccessPoints or a rotating-pool ( where feasible and safe ) of connection-ready AccessPoints may help reduce any latency for this phase down to almost zero add-on setup-time.
4 ) Client, be it a POSACK'd or a NACK'd one, REQ.recv()
-s a reply from the Attestation-server, which in case it was POSACK-attested contains a new AccessPoint definition ( a full set of transport-class specification, an address specification, a port specification (if meaningfull for the given transport-class ) ). The NACK'd cases shall be directed so as not to deteriorate any of the Attestation-server resources ( one element of the set of protection policies to better isolate the Attestation-server from willfully organised massive overloads and other sorts of DDoS attacks )
5 ) It is the Client's turn to try to .connect()
a new private-channel to the Attestation-server proposed AccessPoint, at which it may fail to succeed, if it was NACK'd during any of the attestation-policy checks and directed to some sand-box target(s) if needed to cope in more detail the nature and the evolution of dynamics of the flow of the mix of NACK's and attack attempts.
6 ) POSACK'd Client(s) will keep conversation(s) in private channel(s) of whatever Archetype(s) and orchestration, so the tools for finishing the attestation process with the Attestation-server remain at the server's will and pace.
There are many other ZeroMQ feature that may get involved - per-channel encryption, whitelisting / blacklisting, other ISO/OSI-L2/L3/L4/L5/L7 configuration options, so as to improve the robustness of the Attestation-server's service provisioning.
EPILOGUE ( ... and a bit of late legal disclaimer ) :
Hope I did not just shortcut all the R&D of design & fabrication of the SGX-silicon just by opening a Pandora box of smart distributed-behaviour Troyan archetypes
:o)