Chart of Chinese progress from a US wartime pamphlet
The Bund in Shanghai in the 1930s

The Nanjing decade (also Nanking decade, Chinese: 南京十年; pinyin: Nánjīng shí nián, or the Golden decade, Chinese: 黃金十年; pinyin: Huángjīn shí nián) is an informal name for the decade from 1927 (or 1928) to 1937 in the Republic of China. It began when Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took Nanjing from Zhili clique warlord Sun Chuanfang halfway through the Northern Expedition in 1927. Chiang declared it to be the national capital despite the existence of a left-wing Nationalist government in Wuhan. The Wuhan faction gave in and the Northern Expedition continued until the Beiyang government in Beijing was overthrown in 1928. The decade ended with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the retreat of the Nationalist government to Wuhan. GDP growth averaged 3.9 per cent a year from 1929 to 1941 and per capita GDP about 1.8 per cent.[1] Historians view the decade as a period of Chinese conservatism.[2][3][4]

Nanjing was of symbolic and strategic importance. The Ming dynasty had made Nanjing a capital, the republic had been established there in 1912, and Sun Yat-sen's provisional government had been there. Sun's body was brought and placed in a grand mausoleum to cement Chiang's legitimacy. Chiang was born in nearby Zhejiang and the general area had strong popular support for him.

The Nanjing decade was marked by both progress and frustration. The period was far more stable than the preceding Warlord Era. There was enough stability to allow economic growth and the start of ambitious government projects, some of which were taken up again by the new government of the People's Republic after 1949. Nationalist foreign service officers negotiated diplomatic recognition from Western governments and began to unravel the unequal treaties. Entrepreneurs, educators, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals were more free to create modern institutions than at any earlier time. However, the Nationalist government also suppressed dissent, corruption and nepotism were rampant and revolts broke out in several provinces; internal conflicts also perpetuated within the government. The Nationalists were never able to fully pacify the Chinese Communist Party, and struggled to address the widespread unrest and protests over their failure to check Japanese aggression.

The party-state

Zones of control during the "Nanjing Decade"

The organization and function of the KMT one-party state was derived from Sun's "Three Stages of Revolution" and his policy of Dang Guo. The first stage was military unification, which was carried out with the Northern Expedition. The second was "political tutelage" which was a provisional government led by the KMT to educate people about their political and civil rights, and the third stage was constitutional government. The KMT considered themselves to be at the second stage in 1928.

The KMT set up its five-branch government (based on the Three Principles of the People) using an organic law including Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Control Yuan and Examination Yuan. This government disavowed continuity with the defunct Beiyang government that enjoyed international recognition; however the state was still the same – the Republic of China. Nevertheless, many bureaucrats from the Beiyang government flooded into Nanjing to receive jobs.

Chiang was elected President of the National Government by the KMT central executive committee in October 1928. In the absence of a National Assembly, the KMT's party congress functioned in its place. Since party membership was a requirement for civil service positions, the KMT was full of careerists and opportunists.

The KMT was heavily factionalized into pro- and anti-Chiang groups. The largest faction in the party following reunification was the pro-Chiang Whampoa clique (a.k.a. the National Revolutionary Army First Army Group/Central Army), which made up slightly over half of the party membership. A Whampoa sub-faction was the infamous Blue Shirts Society. Next was the CC Clique, a pro-Chiang civilian group. A third group, the technocratic Political Study Clique, was more liberal than the other two pro-Chiang factions. They were formed by KMT members of the first National Assembly back in 1916. These three factions competed with each other for Chiang's favor.

Opposition to Chiang came from both the left and the right. The leftist opposition was led by Wang Jingwei and known as the Reorganizationists. The rightist opposition was led by Hu Hanmin. Hu never created or joined a faction but he was viewed as the spiritual leader by the Western Hills Group, led by Lin Sen. There were also individuals within the party who were not part of any faction, like Sun Fo. These anti-Chiang figures were outnumbered in the party but held great power by their seniority, unlike many pro-Chiang cadres that joined only during or after the Northern Expedition. Chiang cleverly played these factions off against one another. The party itself was reduced to a mere propaganda machine, while real power lay with Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army (NRA).

Intra-party struggles

In 1922, the KMT had formed the First United Front with the Communists to defeat the warlords and reunify China. In April 1927, however, Chiang split with the Communists and purged them from the Front against the wishes of the KMT leadership in Wuhan, setting up a rival KMT government in Nanjing. The split and the purge was detrimental to the KMT's Northern Expedition and allowed the Zhili-Fengtian coalition to launch a successful counterattack. The mostly leftist Wuhan faction soon purged the Communists as well and reunited with Chiang in Nanjing. The Northern Expedition restarted in February 1928 and successfully reunited China by the end of the year.

At the end of the Expedition, the NRA consisted of four army groups: Chiang's Whampoa clique, Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun, Yan Xishan's Shanxi clique, and Li Zongren's New Guangxi clique. Chiang did not have direct control of the other three so he considered them to be threats.

In February 1929, Li Zongren fired the pro-Chiang governor of Hunan but Chiang objected and the two clashed in March, leading to Li's defeat and (temporary) expulsion from the KMT by the third party congress. Feng Yuxiang rebelled on May 19 but was humiliated when half of his army defected through bribery. From October to February, fighting resumed with Wang Jingwei and Lin Sen joining the opposition. In May 1930, the Central Plains War erupted, pitting Chiang against the Beiping faction of Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren, and Wang Jingwei. Though victorious, the conflict left Chiang's government bankrupt.

In 1931, Hu Hanmin attempted to block Chiang's provisional constitution and was put under house arrest. This caused another uprising by Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Sun Fo and other anti-Chiang factions who converged on Guangzhou to set up a rival government. War was averted due to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria but it did cause Chiang to release Hu and resign as president and premier. Chiang's influence was restored when he was made chairman of the Military Affairs Commission at the start of the Battle of Shanghai (1932). Hu moved to Guangzhou and led an autonomous government in Liangguang.

In November 1933, the Fujian Rebellion erupted by dissident KMT elements. The rebellion was crushed in January.

During Chiang's second premiership, Hu Hanmin died on 12 May 1936 and left a power vacuum in the south. Chiang wanted to fill it with a loyalist that would end the south's autonomy. Chen Jitang and Li Zongren conspired to overthrow Chiang but were politically outmaneuvered by bribes and defections. Chen resigned and the plot fizzled. In December, Chiang was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang and forced to ally with the Communists in the Second United Front to combat the Japanese occupation.

In addition, the Ma clique and the Xinjiang clique, both KMT affiliates, were contesting each other in the western fringes from 1931 until 1937 in the Xinjiang Wars when the Soviet Union's support helped the Xinjiang group to triumph. Xinjiang then became a Soviet protectorate and safe haven for Communists. The Ma clique also fought Sun Dianying in 1934.

Wang Jingwei's collaborationist government during the Second Sino-Japanese War can be seen as an extension of these party power struggles.

These civil wars extended Chiang's direct rule from four provinces to eleven just prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

Suppression of Communists and other parties

The Chinese Civil War which began with the purge of communists in 1927 would continue until the forming of the Second United Front in December 1936. During this period, the Nationalists tried destroying the Communists by using Encirclement Campaigns. The failure of early Communist strategy of urban warfare led to the rise of Mao Zedong who advocated guerrilla warfare. The Communists were much weaker in the urban areas due to secret police repression led by Dai Li. Many Communists and suspected or actual Communist sympathizers were imprisoned, including the wife and four year old daughter of Marshal Nie.[5]

Other parties that were heavily persecuted were the Young China Party and the "Third Party". They would remain banned until the Second Sino-Japanese War when they were allowed into the Second United Front as part of the China Democratic League.

Warlord conflicts during the Nanjing decade

Conflicts with Japan and Soviet Union

Military developments

Following the Central Plains war Chiang was unable to re-assert his full control over the country as Hu Hanmin prevented him from using the legislative Yuan and Wang Jingwei from using the Executive Yuan. Thus Chiang turned to Field Headquarters a military body subordinate to the Military Affairs Commission which he headed thus Chiang based his power around the military and used it to force his agenda through government. These headquarters consisted of the Yu E Wan (Henan, Hubei and Anhui), Yu Shan Jin (Henan, Shaanxi and Shanxi) Beiping (Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan and Hebei) the largest and most important of these was the Nanchang HQ which controlled areas of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, Fujian and Hubei.[6]

Baojia

The Baojia an ancient Chinese institution was slated to become the basis of a new conscript system for the Chinese military, He Yingqin proposed as much in a 1928 report he argued for the implementation of the system due to its ability to produce large amounts of disciplined soldiers without a large cost as well as allowing for rapid expansion in wartime without a great cost too, it would also rekindle militarism in China and weaken banditry, the lack of education and poverty was dismissed by He due to the prevalence of baojia mobilisation in Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou. Universal conscription was rejected due to its infeasibility given China's limited finances and vast population instead troops were to be maintained into 6 categories akin to Japan with the active class serving for 2 years 2 classes of trained reserves with 5 and 10 years respectively and 2 classes of supplementary troops in territorial formations with all surplus men given ad-hoc training when possible, 50 divisions were to be raised in this method.The KMT were thereafter committed to this idea of conscription and the training of a vast body of troops to fight in a war.[7]

However, it was not until 1932 that Chiang ordered the implementation of the Baojia system with all officials ordered down to the county level to organise the training of Baojia with the greatest priority with punishment promised for failure for both local and regional leaders. Chiang ordered the program to be completed in 1934 with 3,000,000 peasants to be enrolled in 3 months in Henan alone. The Yu E Wan Field Headquarters (the task of Baojia generally falling to these HQs) took the lead under Yang Yongtai. Initially, the Baojia served as a militia with their main roles being akin to the emergency/civil services of other countries such as anti-bandit action, working on irrigation, flood control, road building, construction of military positions amongst other tasks and duties additionally, the Baojia worked as a system of registration for the millions of Chinese men and their families allowing for statistics to be recorded comprehensively. The overly rapid goals were already being met in over 80 counties in Anhui by spring 1933 with similar progress in Hubei and Henan.[8]

By 1936 the Baojia system was finally linked to the army system with 50,000 conscripts called up via the Baojia into the regular army in 12 divisions and by early 1937 this rose to 20 divisions being filled with Baojia recruit and 40 more were to be raised as per the 60 division plan.[9]

Militia

The Militia of modern China an invention of Zeng Guofan and his proteges were to become co-opted by the Nationalist Government in order to use them for anti-communist policies and to intensify central government power in local areas. In 1928, the provincial level position of Superintendent of Rural pacification (Qingxiang duban) was founded with Rural Pacification Commanders (Qingxiang Siling) controlling them later renamed to Peace preservation commanders (bao'an siling). The Governor of a province held this post ex officio but with most military and executive actions emanating under this office it quickly became an office equivalent in power to the Governorship. The office was primarily tasked with the suppression of communist revolutionaries and partisans and thus it controlled all the provincial militias.[10][11]

This office was built on the backs of earlier efforts during the Northern Expedition to organise anti-communist militias to control the growth of CCP power in rural areas. These early forms of militas were organised at village, township and town levels with no coordination and with strong local ties which hindered militia efficiency the formation of a provincial office was intended to remedy this and to also prevent the local gentry and "bullies" from using the militia for their own personal gain.[10]

The reforms instituted by Hunan were applied in a similar fashion across the Lower Yangtze region as well as Hubei and Jiangxi.[12] The instituion and proliferation of the militia (peace preservation and Baojia) saw banditry almost eliminated in the provinces where they were established with the remaining bandits fleeing to the mountains or the coastal islands, the Hunan peace forces being used as regular troops temporarily is a testament to the strength of these forces.[12]

Status of Peace Preservation forces 1934[12]
Figures Jiangsu Zhejiang Henan Hubei Hunan Anhui Jiangxi Fujian Shaanxi Total
Men at arms 7,810 N/A 54,686 34,773 33,824 24,233 39,847 29,859 16,542 241,571
handguns 5,748 21,937 22,597 28,682 21,096 20,822 34,383 12,512 16,243 183,450
Mortars 32 52 32 N/A N/A N/A 8 42 N/A 166
Machine guns 70 375 73 N/A 30 N/A 103 42 N/A 518
Expenditure

monthly (yuan) {annual}

480,000 510,000 603,428 400,000 460,000 314,709 470,594 482,592 140,240 3,378,971{40,547,652}

Militia in Hunan

Initial reforms

In Hunan in 1928 a set of regulations was issued by He Jian the governor (and therefore Superintendent) to re-organise the provincial militias and bring them under control of the Central Government. Each county was ordered to organise militia under the term household conscription militia (aihutuan) as well as a general bureau headed by the magistrate to control the County militia's funding, armament, recruitment and deployment of the militia theoretically centralising the militia with a deputy being nominated by the magistrate by recommendations sent from county organisations. The militiamen were divided into 2 categories the first consisted of one out of every 3rd man between the ages of 18 and 40 into the unpaid role of watch patrol (shouwangdui) armed with various melee weapons and shotguns led and organised by the Baojia. The 2nd category was the best men of the watch patrol which were organised into 90 man standing companies (changbeidui) where they served for 3 years with a salary and were given standardised armament each county had to form 5–20 such companies depending on resources and necessity.[10]

However, this first organisation did not go well as the magistrate had many other functions and therefore could not properly attend to the militia meaning the deputy often a local elite member still controlled the militia undermining the purpose of the regulations which was to centralise militia. Secondly, the watch patrols also intended to be used for disemminating KMT doctrine and propganada failed as the localities failed to properly introduce the necessary training and they often lacked the resources regardless thus it was introduced in a desultory manner if it at all. This then undermines the standing companies who were to be recruited from watch patrols and instead regular troops and mercenaries were labelled as watch patrols undermining the efforts to link to a broad popular base there was also a lack of experienced and trained personnel to command these forces lastly, the division of forces into small groups hindered their ability to fight communist groups of a large size or even bandits and they would be reluctant to leave their immediate community not to mention aiding other counties.[10]

Further reforms

In 1930 a new regulation was issues expanding the aihutuan to all able-bodied law-abiding men aged 18–40 with the explicit purpose to militarise the entire province He Jian rejected arming the entire Aihutuan with guns if at all instead focusing on their ability to organise anti-communism giving it a more political purpose than originally intended. He Jian also ordered inspections to assure proper implementation of these regulations province wide the success of these formations was reported in the media as the aihutuan joined the army in anti-communist campaigns. Following a 4 Province conference on militia He Jian authorised further formations ordering each county to consolidate its Changbeidui companies into a singular Peace Preservation battalion or regiment depending on the pre-existing strength. The usage of military terminology was because He Jian intended for these Peace Preservation formations to become auxiliaries for the military and he introduced regulations which brought pay, pensions and recruitment into line with military standards, military officers were to command at higher levels with lower officers given military training and occasionally being rotated into the army itself for short periods in order to gain experience. A further major change was the consolidation of command under the Superintendent (He Jian) bypassing the counties and He then appointed his men into the militia command positions seizing command from the local elites this was furthered by dividing the province into special districts headed by district commanders appointed by He this combined with the usage of militia across multiple districts different areas of the province and by basing them in different regions combined to eliminate county ties completely. In 1933 He had established 29 Peace preservation Regiments for the entirety of Hunan with numerical rather than geographical designations.[10]

Education

Following the Jinan incident public pressure particularly from the student body itself led to the introduction of military training at all Chinese schools with instructors dispatched from the Central government to oversee the implementation of military training with it first implemented in the Lower Yangtze region then spreading to other areas under Nationalist control then the whole country. By 1935 491 Secondary schools and 33,654 secondary students were participating with more schools and students participating in the Lower Yangtze region. All male students under the regulations would have to attend 3 hours of training a week and 1 3 week intensive session in the summer for the first 2 years of high school. Female students received first-aid and other medical training. The instruction was 2 hours a week practical and 1 theoretical. Training was akin to a less intensive military academy course with topics such as combat, fortifications, signalling and communications, marksmanship, drill, armament manufacture and international military trends. In 1935 collective military training was organised in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Nanjing with 3 month courses providing NCO training with it being mandatory for all first year male students with some "spiritual training" in loyalty to the state and the KMT being introduced.[13]

Reforms

China's first government sponsored social engineering program began in 1934 with the New Life Movement.[14] In addition, non-governmental reforms, such as the Rural Reconstruction Movement made substantial progress in addressing the problems of the countryside. Many social activists who participated in this movement were graduated as professors of the United States. They made tangible but limited progress in modernizing the tax, infrastructural, economic, cultural, and educational equipment and mechanisms of rural regions until the cancellation of government coordination and subsidies in the mid-to-late 1930s due to rampant wars and the lack of resources. The rural reconstructive activists advocated a “third way” between the communist violent land reform and the reformism of the Nationalist Government based on the respect of human rights and individual liberties for educational doctrine.[15][16]

Economic improvements and social reforms were mixed. The Kuomintang supported women’s rights and education, the abolition of polygamy, and foot binding. The government of the Republic of China under Chiang’s leadership also enacted a women’s quota in the parliament with reserved seats for women. During the Nanjing Decade, average Chinese citizens received the education they’d never had the chance to get in the dynasties that increased the literacy rate across China. The education also promotes the ideals of Tridemism of democracy, republicanism, science, constitutionalism, and Chinese Nationalism based on the Political Tutelage of the Kuomintang.[17][18][19][20][21] However, Periodic famines continued under Nationalist rule: in Northern China from 1928 to 1930, in Sichuan from 1936 to 1937, and in Henan from 1942 to 1943. In total, these famines cost at least 11.7 million lives by some estimates.[22][23][24][25] GDP growth averaged 3.9 per cent a year from 1929 to 1941 and per capita GDP about 1.8 per cent.[1] Among other institutions, the Nationalist Government founded the Academia Sinica and the Central Bank of China. In 1932, China sent a team for the first time to the Olympic Games.

Postal system

The Chinese Post Office expanded dramatically during the period with over 12,000 offices in existence, the post office also acted as a currency exchange and handler of money particularly with remittances across the urban-rural divide the Office also worked across political boundaries giving it the status of one of the few truly national bodies. The office even offered services beyond these offering insurance policies, saving accounts and gift certificates. These bank-like activities allowed for migration to occur as urban workers had a trusted institution from which they could support their families in rural areas contributing greatly to the modernisation of the economy in the interior as well as the coastal regions.[26]

Education

The new Ministry of education amalgamated and reorganised the education system creating 13 national universities, 5 technical colleges, 9 provincial universities to provide higher education nationwide and help create an educated populace. Additionally, private higher educational institutionals received state subsidies of the 53 private colleges and universities 40 received subsidies in 1936. Secondary education saw even more marked development with the number of schools increasing in number by over 400% with 2,042 middle schools, 1,211 normal schools and 370 professional schools the total enrollment of these schools was 545,207.[27]

Economic developments

Fiscal measures

The Nationalist Government in Nanjing following the northern expedition had achieved nominal unification of China and sought to consolidate their control over China's revenue. Tariff autonomy was regained by 1930, this led to higher import duties which brought a rapid increase in revenue to the central government. The collection of tariffs was also changed from silver to gold; this was due to the falling price of silver following the Great Depression. The Salt tax which previously was seized by local and provincial officials was brought back into Nationalist control whilst transfers to the provinces still did occur, the Nationalist government retained a larger share of the revenue. The Likin, a tax heavily targeting internal trade that was often abused by its collection, was mostly abolished. However, the Nationalist government mainly drew its revenue from the modern sectors of the economy, and the collection of taxes from agriculture was not controlled by Nanjing given that agriculture comprised a large section of the economy. This severely limited the ability of the Nationalist government to raise revenue effectively, leading to large amounts of borrowing and the issuing of bonds to pay for its expenditures. The land tax remained in the hands of the provinces who did not reform or improve its collection. The surrender of the land tax to the provinces in 1928 surrendered some 65% of the GDP to the authority of the provinces to collect taxes from this was made for political reasons mainly to achieve national unity by allowing the provinces to maintain a source of income.

Government debt grew by a considerable amount during this period due to the rising military expenditures as Chiang sought to modernise the Chinese military. The Nanjing government floated over 1.6 Billion Yuan worth of bonds on the Chinese market led to a total bond debt of 2 billion Yuan by 1936. The Shanghai and wider Chinese bond market worked well with the Nationalist government providing significant cash flow to the government.

Infrastructure development

The Nationalist Government invested heavily in road construction for military purposes.[28]:10 It built 82,000 kilometers of roads during the Nanjing decade for a total of 115,000 kilometres.[29][28]:10 The old city walls and shantytowns of many cities were demolished to facilitate roadbuilding.[28]:10 Additionally, during the period the Nationalist government imported 500,000,000 Yuan worth of industrial machinery though this figure is not impressive in comparison to the USSR's industrial development for the more impoverished, factional, agrarian and politically divided China of the period it is a considerable amount, the majority of this industrial machinery was dedicated to textiles, foodstuffs, cement and chemicals all important to a growing nascent industry.[29] The telegraph system abandoned and neglected by the warlords not only recovered but also expanded to over 95,000 kilometres additionally, telephone line length increased 12 fold from 4,000 to 52,500 kilometres, the recovery of basic infrastructure facilitating modern communication was an important part of the development of infrastructure.[29]

GDP of the Republic of China in Billions of 1933 Yuan[30]
Sector Liu and Yeh Ou Pao-san
Agriculture 18.76 12.59
Factories 0.64 0.38
Handicrafts 2.04 1.36
Mining 0.21 0.24
Utilities 0.13 0.15
Construction 0.34 0.22
Modern transportation

and communications (old-fashioned)

0.43

(1.20)

0.92
Trade 2.71 2.54
Government

administration

0.82 0.64
Financial 0.21 0.20
Personal services 0.34 0.31
Residential rents 1.03 0.93
Depreciation adjustments 1.02 1.45
Total 29.88 21.77

The figures provided by Liu and Yeh are deemed to be more reliable.[30]

Modern Industrial figures 1933[31]
Goods

(millions of 1933 Yuan)

Chinese

owned

Foreign

owned

Manchuria Total Workers

Chinese owned (1000s)

Workers

Foreign owned (1000s)

Workers

Manchuria (1000s)

Total
Producer goods
Lumber 4.4 5.6 11.6 21.6 1.2 1.5 2.3 5.0
Machinery (incl. transport) 55.4 9.9 27.2 92.5 45.7 5.2 14.4 65.3
Ferrous metals

metal products

29.4 1.4 18.1 48.9 15.5 0.4 11.8 27.7
electrical appliances 1.3 0.8 N/A 2.1 0.7 0.3 N/A 1.0
Stone, clay and glass

goods

44.5 1.6 9.7 55.8 34.7 1.1 8.9 44.7
Chemicals 58.5 10.0 19.1 87.6 5.6 2.4 4.2 12.2
Textiles 15.3 N/A 1.6 16.9 4.3 N/A 0.4 4.7
Leather 37.0 8.1 1.0 46.1 4.5 0.9 0.7 6.1
Paper and Printing 72.0 10.7 3.4 86.1 42.0 3.6 0.8 46.4
Metal coins 41.0 N/A N/A 41.0 0.2 N/A N/A 0.2
Total 358.8 48.1 91.7 498.5 154.4 15.4 43.5 213.3
Consumer goods
Wood products 1.2 0.5 0.9 2.6 0.5 0.2 0.8 1.5
Metal products 12.6 1.4 1.6 15.6 4.4 0.5 0.7 5.6
electrical appliances 11.9 7.2 0.1 19.2 5.9 3.7 <100 8.6
Pottery 1.3 0.2 0.7 2.2 1.3 N/A 1.9 3.2
Chemicals 65.3 17.2 4.4 86.9 38.4 7.3 4.9 50.6
Textiles 605.4 257.8 70.6 933.8 380.1 104.7 38.8 523.6
Clothing and attire 101.1 4.6 3.4 109.1 101.7 2.0 3.5 107.2
Leather and rubber 36.2 2.2 N/A 38.4 15.1 0.7 N/A 15.8
Food products 436.3 39.1 158.7 634.1 51.2 8.6 21.6 81.4
Tobacco and Alcohol 124.9 117.3 36.0 278.2 20.3 19.0 8.4 47.7
Paper 2.9 0.5 7.9 11.3 1.8 0.2 4.7 6.7
Miscellaneous 13.5 1.3 0.7 15.5 8.1 1.8 0.7 10.6
Total 1,412.6 449.3 285.0 2,146.9 628.8 147.7 86.0 862.5
Grand Total 1,771.4 497.4 376.7 2,645.4 783.2 163.1 129.5 1,075.8
Output of Plant products (1,000,000s of catties[32]*
Crop 1914-1919

(average)

1931-1937

(average)

Rice 147,610 139,110
Wheat 39,570 46,200
Corn 14,680 20,440
Potatoes 7,060 15,280
Kaoliang

(sorghum)

23,750 24,680
Millet 22,180 27,680
Barley 18,090 19,440
Other Grain 10,370 10,940
Total Grain 283,300 319,960
Soybean 10,970 16,800
Peanuts 4,540 5,250
Rapeseed 3,800 5,080
Sesame 670 1,810
Cotton 1,606 1,888
Fibres 1,410 1,350
Tobacco 1,590 1,830
Sugarcane 18,720 18,720
Tea 445 399
Silk 406 420
Total

non-grain

44,157 53,547
Grand Total 327,457 373,207

*A catty being equivalent to roughly 600 grams

Receipts and Expenditure of the Nanjing Government (millions of Yuan)
Sector 1928–29 1933–34 1936–37
Receipts* 434 836 1168
Customs Duty 179 352 379
Salt Duty 30 177 197
Commodity taxes 33 118 173
Other** 92 42 121
Borrowing 100 147 298
Expenditures* 434 836 1168
Party 4 6 7
Civil* 28 160 160
Military 210 373 521
Loan and indemnity

servicing

160 244 302
Other 32 53 178

*the cost of collecting taxes is deducted for all years excluding 1928–29

** mostly consisting of stamp tax, provincial remittances, government business profits and miscellaneous sources

Value of China's foreign trade Million(s) USD[26]
Year Imports Exports
1910 649 503
1920 997 614
1929 1,620 1,070
1930 1,723 944
1931 2,002 915
1932 1,524 569
1933 1,345 612
1934 1,030 535
1935 919 576
1936 941 706

Agriculture

The Field Headquarters acting as the enactors of Chiang's will also ventured into economic development particularly in the countryside. The Co-operatives encouraged by the national government were a major source of development in rural areas, they provided loans, seed, fertiliser and tools as well as establishing irrigation works, workshops and coordinating tree planting to control flooding and rejuvenate soil. The Rural financial assisstance bureaus also provided capital to the countryside and cooperatives. However, these programs were not national nor were they universal in the areas they were implemented, nonetheless progress was made mostly in the lower and central Yangtze regions which were the areas most under Chiang's control and recipients of his attention and resources. A total of 6,223 cooperatives were formed by mid-1935 with over 710,000 members. In Jiangxi where the largest effort was made due to the presence of Communist forces over 3,400,000 Yuan was spent in aid or given as loans with further resources represented with 2,500 ploughs thousands of field tools and 180,000 kilograms of rice seed.[33]

Granaries were also established to store up to 3 months of food and by 1935 in the Nanchang HQ area 228,000 tons of grain was stored.[34]

Warlord activities

Guangdong

Chen Jitang, the governor of Guangdong prioritised as typical of warlords his own provincial development above all else, though he did collaborate with Nanjing when politically expedient, he nonetheless remained devoted to his province. To these ends, Guangdong began a major highway construction programme under his rule, increasing from 3,661 km in 1929 to 17,587 by 1935, the highest in China by province. Another was the usage of his military to suppress banditry which was assisted by the large road network facilitating the movement of troops throughout the province.[35]

Chen, having secured his position in the province saw military development as his priority expanding his army from 50,000 in June 1931 to over 150,000 by July 1932:

First Group Army[36]
Commander/

formation

First Army Second Army Third Army Independent forces
Commander Yu Hanmou Xiang hanping Li yangjing
Chief-of-Staff Yang Gang Ye Minyu Zhou Zhi
Political Department

Director

Li Xunhuan Li Heling Di Junqian
1st Division Li Zhenqiu Zhang Meixin Huang Tingzhen Huang Renhuan
2nd Division Ye Zhao Zhang Da Huang Zhiwe Zhang Ruigui
Training Division Mou Peinan
Guards Brigade Chen Hanguang
1st Brigade Fan Dexing
2nd Brigade Chen Zhang
3rd Brigade Yan Yingyu
1st-8th regiment

To equip his much larger army, Chen renovated the Shijing Arsenal from 1933 to 1935 to the extent that it employed 2,000 workers and had an annual cost of 2,400,000 Yuan. The arsenal producing monthly 12,000 rifles, 2,100,000 cartridges, 6-18 mortars, 6-18 machine guns, 1,200 shells and 20,000 grenades. However, even this was deemed insufficient in terms of artillery production and gas masks and 11,000,000 additional yuan was spent on building further arsenals to remedy this, though these projects were not completed by the time the Liangguang incident broke out and Chen was removed from power. Chen additionally purchased 12 tanks, 15 armoured cars in 1932 and from 1933 to 1936, 29 fighters, 10 reconnaissance planes, 6 monoplanes, 6 bombers, 3 trainers and a transport plane to bolster his airforce. This purchase of material was accompanied by a 300,000 yuan aircraft plant in Shaoguan.[36]

Chen Jitang the Governor of Guandong until his removal in 1936
Provincial revenue and expeniture of Guangdong[37]
Tax name 1930-31 1932-33 1934-35
Revenue
Provincial treasury:
All tax receipts 28,858,817 31,731,193 52,181,711
Non-tax receipts 20,537,010 17,226,681 22,045,527
Total 49,395,827 48,957,874 74,227,238
Expenditure
Provincial treasury:
Regular expenses 16,988,095 15,401,788 30,143,869
Total expenses 65,666,101 63,969,102 72,432,654
Balance of Provincial

treasury

-16,270,274 14,993,228 +1,794,584

As the table indicates, the province of Guangdong ran consistent budget deficits and its overspending meant that the money allocated to the national treasury and therefore for Nanjing were never forwarded to the central government, though military expenses of a province were allocated to the national treasury and not the provincial treasury, unless there was a deficit where the provincial treasury would account for the shortfall.[37]

National treasury revenue and expenditure of Guangdong[37]
Revenue

and expenditures

1930-31 1932-33 1934-35
Salt tax 8,325,137 7,054,409 5,004,271
Tobacco/wine tax 4,103,348 4,635,919 5,029,683
Stamp tax 1,692,228 1,731,235 1,998,822
Customs 632,690 37,258 63,098
Consolidated tax* 1,275,677 10,176,848 15,257,598
Opium Suppression 5,994,699 8,699,971 11,271,292
Others 7,911,580 188,780 283,306
Non-tax receipts 1,672,362 3,959,155 5,004,956
Total 31,607,721 36,483,575 43,913,026
Party expenses 49,880 15,856 30,472
Diplomatic expenses 5,320 4,088 7,862
Administrative expenses

of home affairs

236,993 352,536 406,999
Financial administration

expenses

1,378,978 572,797 2,725,880
Educational expenses 1,277,800 1,993,597 3,590,275
Military expenses 40,256,960 45,412,781 59,956,742
Others 13,442,491 7,595,984 3,772,706
Total 56,648,422 55,947,639 70,490,936
Balance -25,040,701 -19,464,064 -26,577,910

*excise on cloth,rolled tobacco, cotton yarn, matches and cement

The Guangdong national treasury never turned a profit under Chen Jitang, this angered Chiang Kai-Shek who in 1931 (prior to Chen's large military expansion) complained that Chen had claimed the entire national treasury to defray his own military spending and accordingly his military expenditure. According to the central government, regulations should not exceed 1,500,000 a month, yet Chen claimed 4,300,000 yuan a month, triple the amount of men he retained in 1931. He additionally earned 800,000 yuan a month from the Guangxi territories he occupied and did not report this to the central government at all.[37]

Social policies

In Jiangxi, the new life movement was driven by the motivation of Chiang Kai-Shek and his encirclement campaigns to eradicate communism in the province. The movement was intended to mobilise society against communism and provide a viable alternative system of administration. Xiong Shihui was the long term governor of Jiangxi in between 1931 and 1942. The association was organised at a county level by the end of 1935c in Jiangxi alone there were associations in 64 counties, 2 townships and 2 special districts.[38]

By 1935, the Movement was openly collaborating with the YMCA and Churches within China, with New life corps of up to 10 members being formed to disseminate the principles of the movement at a grassroots level, as well as during Church services, with Chiang and his wife openly appointing Christian leaders into the movement and visiting them calling for cooperation with the movement.[39]

The Government additionally re-organised schools from the bao level up and forming Sun Yat-Sen's People Schools. Central government funding for education increased from 23,290,000 Yuan in 1933 to 55,400,000 Yuan in 1936, though schools were additionally subsidised by the local elites, so the total education budget cannot be obtained. The New Life Movement had its teachings woven into the curriculum. The schools accepted pupils between the ages of 10-16 and adults 16-50. The curriculum teaching included writing, reading, maths, the Three Principles of the People, communist atrocities, traditional morals, citizenship physical education and self-defence. It also promoted local agriculture, co-operatives and new life principles. Lessons around filial piety in particular were emphasized in terms of self-sacrifice for one's nation. In 1934, Jiangxi had 47 counties and 5 special districts who had 1,168 people's schools with 56,500 students and 2,025 teachers at an annual cost of 65,022 Yuan.[39]

The Bao schools were aimed more towards eliminating illiteracy in children. Adults with attendance made compulsory children aged 6–15 who had not been previously educated, had to enroll for 4 years. Adults who had not attended the schools were to attend for 6 months in night classes. Whilst the schools obtained money from the provincial government, Military Affairs Council and the Boxer Indemnity fund, the bao schools obtained funding from the provincial and local governments as well as the local elite. In 1935, there were 14,448 schools, a total of 54.3% of bao possessed schools and this percentage rose as the total number of schools grew to 17,938 in 1937.[39]

Conclusion

The decade came to an end with the Second Sino-Japanese War. Being located near the coast, it was vulnerable so the capital was moved to Chongqing for the duration of the war. While the transfer of the capital marked its political end, the symbolic end was the Nanjing Massacre (the Rape of Nanjing) when up to 300,000 inhabitants died during the Japanese occupation.

See also

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