Yuri Bekirovich Osmanov
Born(1941-04-01)1 April 1941
Died7 November 1993 (aged 52)
NationalityCrimean Tatar
CitizenshipSoviet Union
Ukraine
Alma materBauman Moscow State Technical University
Political partyNDKT
SpouseAyshe Dobro

Yuri Bekirovich Osmanov (Crimean Tatar: Yuriy Bekir oğlu Osmanov, Russian: Юрий Бекирович Османов; 1 April 1941, Büyük Qaralez, Bakhchysarai district, Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, RSFSR, USSR — 7 November 1993, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, Ukraine) was a scientist, engineer, Marxist–Leninist, and Crimean Tatar civil rights activist. He was one of the co-founders of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars, which sought full right of return of the Crimean Tatar people to their homeland and restoration of the Crimean ASSR.[1][2][3][4][5]

Early life

Osmanov was born on 1 April 1941 in Büyük Qaralez, Crimea. His father Bekir Osmanov was an agronomist of Crimean Tatar ethnicity who became a scout for the Soviet partisans during the German occupation of Crimea, during which Yuri was evacuated to Azerbaijan with his mother, a Belarusian. A postwar book about partisans in Crimea falsely stated that his father was a German spy who was shot, but in reality he survived the war and never sided with the Germans, and the central committee eventually acknowledged the claim was false, and ordered that later editions of the book be corrected.[6] In 1944 the Osmanov family was deported to Ferghana in the Uzbek SSR as "special settlers" because of their Crimean Tatar background. Despite being just a small child during World War II, having been away from Crimea during the conflict, and being the son of a wounded partisan, the declaration that Crimean Tatars were traitors was applied to him and he was treated like a second-class citizen as a result. After completing secondary school in 1958 with excellent marks he applied to enter Moscow State University since his grades were high enough, but he was rejected because he was Crimean Tatar and hence officially forbidden from attending an institution outside Central Asia. However, Amet-khan Sultan put in a good word about Osmanov to academics, and he was eventually allowed to attend Bauman Moscow State Technical University. There, he graduated in 1965 with a degree in mechanical engineering. He worked at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research and the Institute for High Energy Physics; while there he became interested in the Crimean Tatar civil rights movement, and spent his free time studying the legacy and works of Ismail Gasprinsky, the founder of the Crimean Tatar enlightenment.[7]

Activism

Background

At that time Osmanov became an activist, most deported peoples who had survived the "special settler" regime including Chechens and Kalmyks were completely allowed to return to their homeland and were not denied residence permits necessary for doing so; however, Soviet leadership did not apply the same policy for Crimean Tatars, and as a result a vast majority of Crimean Tatars were forced to remain in exile due to being unable to get a residence permits in Crimea.[8][9] However, the official Soviet narrative was that the Crimean Tatars had taken root in their place of exile and had equal rights - despite not having the same rights to residence permits in their previous land of residence as other deported nations, and the claim that Crimean Tatars had "taken root" was a false;[10] not only were they targets of pogroms, but there was a clear desire to return to Crimea, a theme pervasive throughout all aspects of their culture, ranging from embroidery featuring the peninsula to the mournful song Ey Guzel Qirim. Moscow's refusal to allow a return was not only based out of a desire to satisfy the new Russian settlers in Crimea, who were very hostile to the idea of a return,[11] but for economic reasons: high productivity from Crimean Tatar industries in Central Asia meant that letting the diaspora return would take a toll on the industrialization goals of Central Asia. Historians have long suspected that violent resistance to confinement in exile from Chechens led to further willingness to let them return, while the non-violent Crimean Tatar movement did not lead to any desire from the government of the Uzbek SSR for Crimean Tatars to leave. In effect, the government was punishing Crimean Tatars for being Stakhanovites while rewarding the deported nations that contributed less to the building of socialism, creating further resentment.[12][13]

Political activities in the Soviet Union

In January 1968 Osmanov faced his first arrest for distributing leaflet stating grievances of Crimean Tatars and demanding full rehabilitation, for which he was sentenced to two and a half years in a high-security penal labour colony. Upon release from the Kyzylkum gold mine he began working at a glass factory in Azerbaijan as an engineer before returning to Ferghana in 1972. There he worked at a nitrogen fertilizer factory and later at the Giprovodkhoz Institute, all while continuing to remain politically active. One of the projects of his activism was an evaluation of the extent of the losses to the Crimean Tatar people caused by the deportation. From 1973 to 1974 he and his father worked on conducting a census of deported Crimean Tatars in Central Asia, in which they estimated that the real number of Crimean Tatars deported in 1944 was 423,100 - well above the official estimates in the range of 200,000. The KGB insisted that the mortality rate of deported Crimean Tatars was "only" around 22% in the first few years of exile,[14] but the Osmanov census showed a figure of around 46%,[15] which led to his conclusion that the Soviet censuses were falsified.[16] After compiling the census and evaluating the losses, he created a list of seven grievances against Soviet policy that he sent to the central government of the USSR as well as the UN.[17] In December 1982 he was arrested for distributing a series leaflets describing Crimean Tatar mistreatment in the Soviet Union, for which he was charged "defaming the Soviet system"; his samizdat works that led to his arrest included a leaflet titled "Genocide-Israeli style" that compared the treatment of Crimean Tatars by the USSR and Palestinians by Israel.[18] Subsequently, he served three years in a high-security labor camp in Yakutia, and then three days before his scheduled release he was forcibly taken to the Blagoveshchensk psychiatric hospital, where he was detained for another two years and subject to punitive psychiatry. While in prison, his father, one of the few who was allowed to return to Crimea, died. At the funeral, which had intense KGB surveillance, he was buried next to Musa Mamut, who had committed self-immolation in protest of being forced to leave Crimea.[2] Yuri Osmanov was released in September 1987 during perestroika and returned to activism. Earlier that year in July, a state commission was created to consider and evaluate the request for the right of return, chaired by Andrey Gromyko.[19]

Gromyko's condescending attitude[20] and failure to assure them that they would have the right of return[21] ended up concerning members of the Crimean Tatar civil rights movement. In June he rejected the request for re-establishment of a Crimean Tatar autonomy in Crimea and supported only small efforts for return, while agreeing to allow the lower-priority requests of having more publications and school instruction in the Crimean Tatar language at the local level among areas with the deported populations.[22] Gromyko's eventual conclusion that "no basis to renew autonomy and grant Crimean Tatars the right to return"[23] triggered widespread protests.[24][25] Anatoly Lukyanov from the commission had pointed out that other nations deported in the war were allowed to return, and noted that the case of the Kalmyks, who were deported less than a year before the Crimean Tatars for the same official reason but allowed to return to Kalmykia in the 1950s. Kalmyk collaboration with the Germans in the war was not used as a reason to treat Kalmyk civilians as second-class citizens in the 1980s, since by then they had become effectively rehabilitated, while the treatment of Crimean Tatars as second-class citizens at the time was often justified by reiterating the same official talking points about their alleged actions in World War II.[26] Less than two years after Gromyko's commission had rejected their request for autonomy and return, pogroms against the deported Meskhetian Turks were taking place in Central Asia. During the pogroms, some Crimean Tatars were targeted as well, but Osmanov played an active role in de-escalating the conflict and protecting local Crimean Tatar communities from attackers. After the pogroms, it became clear to the leadership of the USSR that Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks had not fully assimilated into Central Asia as intended, and a second commission containing Osmanov was established to reconsider the Crimean Tatars requests. In November the military adopted the resolution "On the Recognition of the Repressive Acts Against Peoples Subjected to Forced Displacement and Ensuring their Rights", which was based on the draft "Declaration on the Crime and Wrongfulness of State Acts Against Peoples Victimized by Deportation." On 14 December 1989 the Supreme Soviet declared the deportation to have been illegal, and in 1990 Osmanov was appointed the acting chairman of the State Committee for Deported Peoples in the Crimean Regional Executive Committee. There, he managed to get the leadership of the Central Asian republics and Crimea to permit the full return and was granted funding to support returning people. He held the post until March 1991.[2]

Longstanding disagreements between followers of Osmanov and Dzhemilev became more apparent during the perestroika era. While the goal of Osmanov's NDKT (Russian: НДКТ, Национального движения крымских татар) was the restoration of the Crimean ASSR under the Leninist principle of national autonomy for titular indigenous peoples in their homeland, the Dzhemilev faction, at the time under the banner of the OKND, which later became the Mejilis, wanted the creation of an independent Crimean Tatar state. Osmanov was very afraid that the more radical OKND would exacerbate already-strained ethnic tensions in Crimea, with Tatarophobia being widespread and the OKND claiming more and more land in Crimea instead of trying to take more reconciliatory measures.[2][27][28][29]

Later years

After leaving the commission, Osmanov devoted himself to journalism and the NDKT. In 1991 he established the newspaper "Areket", which he was the editor of for the remainder of his life. He also wrote for other newspapers, writing op-eds about the interethnic relations in Crimea. In 1992 he moved to his homeland, Crimea, with his wife and daughter. In March 1993 he became the dean of the faculty for oriental studies at Taurida Ecological and Political University. Later that year he visited Turkey to meet with the Crimean Tatar diaspora there. The meeting went well, but Osmanov's disagreements with the Mejilis intensified after Dzhemilev made controversial comments to two Turkish newspapers. Osmanov was very afraid of Crimea turning into a violent place like Chechnya and worried that Dzhemliev's methods would provoke the local Russian population. However, before Osmanov could see through with his political aspirations, he was badly beaten while walking home from work on the evening of 6 November 1993 and was found dead of his injuries the next day. Many of his followers believe it was a political assassination. He was buried in the Abdal cemetery.[30][31][32] The death of Osmanov led to the downfall of the NDKT into near oblivion, leaving the Mejilis as the largest Crimean Tatar political party.[33]

See also

References

  1. "Yuri Bekirovich Osmanov // Yu. Osmanov. "White Book of the Crimean Tatars National Movement"".
  2. 1 2 3 4 Bekirova, Gulnara (1 April 2016). "Юрий Османов". Крым.Реалии (in Russian). Retrieved 13 September 2019.
  3. Skutsch, Carl (2013). Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities. Routledge. p. 1190. ISBN 9781135193881.
  4. Umbach, Frank (1994). Russia and the Problems of Ukraine's Cohesion: Results of a Fact-finding Mission. Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien. p. 30.
  5. Afkār Inquiry. Tropvale Limited. June 1984. p. 61.
  6. Osmanov, Bekir; Osmanov, Yuri (2001). Не о спокойной жизни мы мечтали (in Russian). Simferopol: Dolina. pp. 2–4. ISBN 9667637700. OCLC 58418725.
  7. Khurshutov, Asan R. (2007). Екзамен за второй день четверть (in Russian). Simferopol: VGMI Tavriya. p. 116. ISBN 9789664351437. OCLC 261297982.
  8. Buttino, Marco (1993). In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union. p. 68. ISBN 88-07-99048-2.
  9. Allworth, Edward; Asia, Columbia University Center for the Study of Central (1988). Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival : Original Studies from North America, Unofficial and Official Documents from Czarist and Soviet Sources. Duke University Press. p. 226. ISBN 9780822307587.
  10. Bekirova, Gulnara (20 October 2012). "Крымские татары: этногенез, история государственных учреждений, миграционные процессы, культурное наследие". Ukrainian Oriental Studies (in Russian): 135–137.
  11. Williams, Brian Glyn (2001). The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation. BRILL. p. 265. ISBN 9789004121225.
  12. Buckley, Cynthia J.; Ruble, Blair A.; Hofmann, Erin Trouth (2008). Migration, Homeland, and Belonging in Eurasia. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 213. ISBN 9780801890758.
  13. Williams, Brian Glyn (2015). The Crimean Tatars: From Soviet Genocide to Putin's Conquest. Oxford University Press. p. 108. ISBN 9780190494704.
  14. Human Rights Watch 1991, p. 34.
  15. Allworth 1998, p. 6.
  16. Osmanov 2013, p. 85.
  17. "Белая книга национального движения крымских татар".
  18. Ablyazov, Emir (8 December 2017). "Четыре обыска Юрия Османова". goloskrimanew.ru. Retrieved 22 December 2020.
  19. Rau, Zbigniew (2019). The Reemergence Of Civil Society In Eastern Europe And The Soviet Union. Routledge. p. 164. ISBN 9781000305111.
  20. Fouse, Gary C. (2000). The Languages of the Former Soviet Republics: Their History and Development. University Press of America. p. 340. ISBN 9780761816072.
  21. Mastny, Vojtech (2019). Soviet/east European Survey, 1987-1988: Selected Research And Analysis From Radio Free Europe/radio Liberty. Routledge. p. 133. ISBN 9781000312751.
  22. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate by the Department of State in Accordance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1989. p. 1230.
  23. Human Rights Watch 1991, p. 38.
  24. Vyatkin, Anatoly (1997). Крымские татары: проблемы репатриации (in Russian). Ин-т востоковедения РАН. p. 32. ISBN 9785892820318.
  25. Olcott, Martha Brill; Hajda, Lubomyr; Olcott, Anthony (26 July 2019). The Soviet Multinational State. Routledge. ISBN 9781315494432.
  26. Dichkov, Aleksandr (2018). Загадка древнего завета. Исторический детектив (in Russian). Litres. p. 701. ISBN 9785040537594.
  27. Расы и народы (in Russian). Nauka. 1997. p. 124.
  28. Kasyanenko, Nikita (14 April 2001). ""...К сыну от отца — закалять сердца"". day.kyiv.ua.
  29. Guboglo, Mikhail; Chervonnaya, Svetlana (1992). Крымскотатарское национальное движение (in Russian). Москва: Центр по изучению межнациональных отношений. ISBN 978-5-201-00836-9. OCLC 29281153.
  30. "Крымские татары не враги России". Милли Фирка (in Russian). 8 September 2014. Retrieved 13 September 2019.
  31. Chernetsov, Konstantin (1999). Крым бандитский. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf.
  32. Белая книга Национального движения крымских татар. Simferopol: Biznes Inform. 2011. p. 11. ISBN 978-966-648-279-5. OCLC 746463537.
  33. Yang, Yering (2010). Национализм в поздне-- и посткоммунистической Европе (in Russian). Rosspen. p. 216. ISBN 9785824313055.

Bibliography


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